Relationships between Iran and Saudi Arabia: Thanks to Beijing, Tehran, and Riyadh were able to come to an agreement over energy issues.

 On March 10, 2023, a significant rapprochement between two distant powers—Iran and Saudi Arabia, who are historic rivals and two of the world's largest oil producers and who have taken opposing positions on a wide range of issues and are politically divided—took place. It was an unexpected development in a contentious relationship marked by ideological, spiritual, and sectarian disagreements that brought together a fragmented Islamic world with numerous divisions. There is now a fusion of interests.

It has taken time to create the essence. Initial negotiations took place in Oman and Iraq in April 2020. Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi facilitated five rounds before Iraqi politics got in the way. In October 2022, Kadhimi left office, and Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani had little interest in carrying on Iraq's mediation efforts. The Saudis did not trust him as much as they did his predecessor.

When President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh in December 2022, Saudi Arabia requested China to act as a mediator, seemingly frustrated by the delay. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi visited China in February 2023, where he met with President Xi and discussed the idea of resuming relations. The discussions were then elevated to a global level, with China serving as the host. As a result, Beijing witnessed the groundbreaking agreement's signing. Wang Yi referred to it as a "Victory for Dialogue, Victory for Peace" because China had a significant impact.

Relationships between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been attempting to mend since Iranian protesters took control of Saudi diplomatic offices in Tehran and Mashhad in 2016. The strained relationship then hit a new low when Iran canceled the Haj pilgrimage.

High levels of hostility exist between the two nations, which have been at odds since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iraq was supported by Saudi Arabia during the War of Revolution. Iranians have recently come to believe that pressure from Israel and Saudi Arabia was a factor in the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. Iran was charged with "using the revenue from the lifting of the sanctions to destabilize the region," according to Saudi Arabia. Although there is currently a tense ceasefire, Iran was said to have supported the Houthi rebels in Yemen and provided the weapons that were used to attack Saudi Aramco refineries. They were suspected of stirring up protests in Bahrain during the Arab Spring.

Iran demanded that Saudi Arabia stop funding Iran International, a Persian-language news channel that gives a platform to opponents of the Islamic Republic, their coverage of the protests in exchange for Saudi Arabia re-enforcing Iranian's prior assurances of non-interference in Saudi internal affairs. For the past five months, Iran believes it has been stoking unrest throughout the nation.

They want Saudi Arabia to end all of its military operations in Yemen and to recognize the Ansarallah (Houthi) movement as the country's legitimate government. Additionally, they urged Riyadh to stop funding militant Baloch groups Jaish al-Adl and Al-Ahvaziya as well as the Mujahedin-e Khalq, an ethnic Arab group. Iran views all three as terrorist groups. Iran also requested that Saudi Arabia lessen its restrictions on its Shiite minority and permit members to travel to Mashhad, the holiest Shiite city in Iran.

Motives for the reconciliation

As the JCPOA negotiations stalled, Iran was getting close to a high level of enrichment and was afraid that the US and Israel would attack its facilities. The threat of military action against it will now be lessened by the agreement. On the other hand, it appears that Saudi Arabia's agreement with Iran is an effort to avoid getting involved in a conflict.

Iran was also becoming more and more isolated on a regional and international level as a result of the sanctions put in place. It recently normalized relations with the UAE in an effort to increase its options and fend off mounting Western pressure. Without making any changes to its policies, Iran has now resisted being isolated in the region. Even though it has recently adopted a "look to the East" policy in part to offset US and European sanctions and is considered to be a part of an emerging Russia and China axis, Saudi Arabia's relations in the region would help it feel less isolated.

After the JCPOA was signed in 2015 and now as a result of President Biden's perceived attitude towards the region, Saudi Arabia began to show signs of frustration with the US, particularly the Democrats. Crown Prince MBS believed he was being pursued in relation to the 2018 slaying of Jamal Khashoggi. The US also made public a 9/11 report in 2021 that might have implicated Saudi Arabia.

Many Saudis believed that the US government did not take action on their behalf in 2019 after an Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq oil facilities. It became clear that Saudi Arabia was on its own and would never receive similar security guarantees from Washington as Israel did.

They believed that their security partners needed to be more varied. The warning signs were there; the US had charged Saudi Arabia with supporting Russia when OPEC+ decided to reduce oil production in defiance of the US. The US-Saudi alliance significantly deteriorated.

In an effort to reduce Russian oil revenues, President Biden visited Saudi Arabia in July 2022 but was unsuccessful in persuading them to increase oil production. They have largely supported UNGA resolutions, but they have not participated in the implementation of sanctions against Moscow or other measures meant to put pressure on Russia. On March 8, 2023, Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud, the foreign affairs minister of Saudi Arabia, also traveled to Moscow, where he met with Sergey Lavrov, his Russian counterpart.

Surprisingly, Saudi Arabia had informed the US earlier in November 2022 that Iran was preparing a missile attack against it. It wants to concentrate on its own nuclear program and forge an independent foreign policy from the West. In China and Russia, they are also observing new security matrices.

The Saudis have stressed recently that they seek to avoid involvement in what is known in the US as "great power competition," according to Gerald Feierstein, a former US ambassador to Yemen. Their interests have centered on upholding solid ties with the US, their top economic partner, China, and their most important OPEC+ partner, Russia.

With strong ties to both Saudi Arabia, which is China's top oil supplier, and Iran, which depends on China for 30% of its foreign trade and where China has promised to invest $400 billion over 25 years, China is seen as a neutral party. Iran sells oil to China at a significant discount because it has few export markets due to crippling sanctions over its nuclear program and is experiencing high inflation. It has transacted business worth over $100 billion.

China needs to maintain a balance between its major energy suppliers and its relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran. The stability of the region is very important. China has significant investments in Iran, with which it has a $400 billion investment and a 25-year strategic partnership. The BRI also spans the entire region. It is in their economic interests to have Saudi Arabia and Iran as allies because their investments in the region's energy, trade, and technology are paying off. According to reports, President Riasi expressed concern over China allegedly providing Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles.

Has China stepped outside of its traditional position and taken center stage in world politics? 

It is now a geostrategic force that cannot be ignored. Additionally, it is simpler for them to deal with these nations because they do not comment on their internal affairs, such as issues involving women's rights and the hijab in Iran or the murder of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia. Their priorities are an economic partnership with Saudi Arabia and a strategic alliance with Iran. China undoubtedly views trilateral cooperation as a success.

The talks did not involve the US. Since the 1945 meeting between King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, US-Saudi relations have been based on energy for the US and security for Saudi Arabia, with both nations agreeing to disagree on Palestine.

The US considers itself to be the area's preeminent superpower. It has dominated international diplomacy. Now that things have changed, it was still crucial to the region but was unable to broker this agreement due to its friendship with Israel and hostility towards Iran, with which it has not maintained diplomatic relations since 1979.

Since their failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have given them the opportunity for regional cooperation, they have demonstrated a clear lack of interest in the region and are perceived as an unreliable partner.

After focusing on China's rise and its expansionism in the Indo-Pacific region during President Obama's so-called "pivot to Asia," the US is once again becoming more Europe-centric in light of the Ukrainian conflict. Thus, the agreement is viewed as a setback for the US in the area. But does this agreement violate the order they have been attempting to establish?

"If this agreement actually bears out, and particularly if Iran follows through on the commitments that it's apparently made, again, that would be positive," said US Secretary of State Antony Blinken during a trip to Ethiopia. "From our perspective, anything that can help reduce tensions, avoid conflict, and curb in any way risky or unstable behavior by Iran is a good thing," he continued.

Israel's worries

While the agreement is well received throughout the Middle East, Israel will pay a price for the Saudi Arabia-Iran détente that has both regional and global implications. The Abrahams Accord will suffer as a result. Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, has taken a tough stance towards Iran and frequently warned that the stability of the region is threatened by its nuclear program. He made a significant effort to strengthen his ties with Saudi Arabia while continuing his offensives against Iran.

Israel was forming an Arab alliance to oppose Iran, but this appears to be in jeopardy as both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are now establishing ties with Iran. They are no longer dependent on Iran to forge closer ties with Israel. This agreement has now deteriorated due to Israel's efforts to drive a wedge between the proposed alliance and an Arab ally against Iran.

Israel worries that the deal could obstruct its efforts to gain a military foothold in the region and open the door for a resolution to the Yemeni conflict, which offered a chance for Israel to expand its influence in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea. Saudi Arabia's top priorities undoubtedly include removing itself from Yemen, where it has been involved since 2015. A potential new Taif Agreement in Lebanon, whose parties maybe Saudi Arabia and Iran and which would ensure the stability of the Lebanese regime and economy, is another issue for Israel. With Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, South Sudan, and Venezuela losing their right to vote at the UN because they were at least two years behind on their contributions, Lebanon has joined a select group. Israeli interests have been served by Lebanon's demise.

Conclusion

By utilizing its connections, China has stepped into the power vacuum and is positioning itself to become a significant player in West Asia, where it has significant geoeconomic interests. China is positioning itself as a global force for peace, filling what the US once filled. However, the two main protagonists are coming closer together over the desire for a reliable security architecture.